Following their larger counterparts, an increasing number of small firms outsource their IT tasks to lower cost offshore destinations. For small firms, however, offshore outsourcing is a difficult undertaking as it involves high transaction costs. Online marketplaces for IT services, which have recently become available to small firms, make offshore IT outsourcing more accessible and manageable, although differences in the marketplace design result in varying outcomes across the marketplaces. This has consequences for SME's decision as to which online 
INTRODUCTION
Offshore outsourcing of IT services has become a large industry in India, Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and other regions of the world, employing hundreds of thousands of people and generating tens of billions dollars in turnover on a yearly basis (Carmel and Tija 2005) .
Although offshore IT outsourcing has gone mainstream, until recently large businesses were the only ones enjoying the lion's share of benefits from offshore IT outsourcing as well as the attention from the academic community in this respect.
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are a potential source of tremendous demand for offshore IT outsourcing services. European SMEs alone are predicted to spend USD 109 bln on IT investments in 2006 1 . Their demand for offshore IT outsourcing, however, remains to be realized! In comparison to their larger counterparts, SMEs face more difficulties with the access to IT resources due to factors, such as poorer access to financing (Dean, et al. 1998 ) and poorer in-house availability of dedicated high-skilled technical personnel (Nooteboom 1993 ).
In offshore IT outsourcing SMEs face relatively high costs of contacting, contracting, and controlling suppliers than large firms (Carmel and Nicholson 2005) .
For SMEs, the recent rise of online marketplaces for professional services came as a blessing.
Online marketplaces facilitate SMEs' access to offshore resources by providing functionality for supplier search, projects allocation and execution. The leading online marketplaces with a strong focus on IT include Elance Online, Rent a Coder, and eWork. In the early 2006 Rent a Coder was facilitating over 12 thousand IT projects on a monthly basis while enjoying a 60%
yearly growth (Radkevitch 2006) . Elance Online has conducted transactions for over USD 90 million since the marketplace launched in 1999 2 .
These marketplaces typically support a similar range of core exchange functionality, such as catalogues of suppliers; project pricing and allocation by means of reverse auctions; settlement of payments; workspace; and supplier rating and feedback systems (Snir & Hitt, 2003) . The differences between the marketplaces are in more subtle design dimensions such as the level of market entry barriers or collaboration functionality. According to the electronic markets literature, aspects of market design account for differences in the success and outcomes of online marketplaces van Heck 1998, Koppius 2002 ). In particular, while having low market entry barriers is important to attract the critical mass of buyers and suppliers (Kambil and van Heck 2002) , entry of low quality participants of both types results in a large proportion of potential deals being cancelled (Radkevitch, et al. 2006, Snir and Hitt 2003) .
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, this paper aims to analyze how online marketplaces for IT services facilitate SMEs' access to offshore IT resources. We look at ten distinct market processes of a leading online marketplace, and discuss their effect on buyer and supplier transaction costs through the facets of the process-stakeholder analysis framework developed by Kambil and van Heck (1998) . Second, we consider differences in entry barriers of two leading online marketplaces, and empirically analyze their impact on market outcomes along three dimensions: the percentage of awarded projects, average project price, and average satisfaction with the supplier.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature on offshore IT outsourcing, economics of small firms and their use of IT, and on online markets.
In Section 3 we analyze the transaction cost reduction effects of online marketplaces. In Section 4 we elaborate on market entry barriers and formulate hypotheses relating entry barriers to market outcomes. Section 5 is dedicated to hypotheses testing and discussion of the results. Section 6 presents conclusions of the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Offshore IT outsourcing
Offshore IT outsourcing is a complex business arrangement that reaches across national and cultural borders. Academic research on both "local" and offshore IT outsourcing centers on issues such as outsourcing decisions (Ang & Straub, 1998; Poppo & Zenger, 1998) , managing relationships and processes with outsourcing partners (Feeny, et IT outsourcing starts with a decision to outsource. Transaction costs defined by transaction attributes, such as asset specificity and measurement difficulty, and production efficiencies associated with outsourcing influence outsourcing decisions and degree of outsourcing (Ang and Straub 1998). When outsourcing goes offshore, criteria such as business environment, political risks, labor pool size, and costs need to be analyzed in the choice of offshore destination (Carmel and Tija 2005) . A number of specific selection criteria, such as language skills, international experience global presence, and infrastructure have to be considered when selecting an offshore outsourcing provider, in addition to a general set of criteria such as costs, reputation, financial stability, processes, etc. (Carmel and Tija 2005) .
Managing offshore outsourcing contracts once they are under way is even a more complex task.
Costs of control make up the greatest portion of buyer's transaction costs. Due to micromanagement, transaction costs of US companies amount to 50% of offshore outsourcing contract volume, while they are only 5 to 10% when domestic outsourcing companies are involved (Rottman and Lacity 2006) . Competitive bidding and ambiguity of the specifications of IT projects may result in outsourcing providers falling prey to winner's curse that can negatively affect performance of all parties involved (Kern, et al. 2002) . The success of offshore outsourcing projects is also dependent on the relationships that develop between the parties, particularly on trust, cooperation and joint problem solving (Feeny, et al. 2005 , Sabherwal 1999 ). These relationships are dynamic and can develop either through a virtuous or a vicious (distrust) cycle (Sabherwal, 1999) , making proper control of the relationship of great importance.
Economics of small firms and the use of IT
Small firms received special treatment in the economic and managerial literature due to a number of properties that make them different from large firms. Small firms enjoy a number of advantages over their large counterparts, but also suffer from specific disadvantages. The advantages are of a behavioral nature, while the disadvantages are rooted in poorer availability of material resources (Nooteboom, 1993) . Due to factors, such as the entrepreneurial drive, risk taking, motivation and perseverance, less bureaucracy, greater flexibility as well as proximity of management to the customer and to production, SMEs can be potentially successful in competition (Nooteboom, 1993) . On the other hand, small firms generally face smaller economies of scale and scope, as well as inferior economies of experience and learning (Nooteboom, 1993) .
Disadvantages of small firms can be best explained via the facets of transaction costs economics (TCE) that analyses transaction governance choices on the basis of underlying transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) . Nooteboom (1993) analyzed the effect of firm's size on the transaction costs along the dimensions of contact, contract, and control. By discussing the effects of the economies of scope, scale, experience, and learning, he showed that small firms bear higher costs to contact, contract, and control a transaction partner. Small firms appear to be less capable of making use of these economies due to bounded rationality, uncertainty, and asset specificity (Nooteboom, 1993) .
Small firms also face more difficulties with the IT resources due to poorer access to financial resources (Dean et al., 1998) and poorer in-house availability of dedicated high-skilled technical personnel (Nooteboom, 1993) . Extending the work of Nooteboom, (Carmel and Nicholson 2005) showed that small firms are also less involved in offshore IT outsourcing due to relatively higher costs of contacting, contracting, and controlling offshore vendors. These costs encompass, correspondingly: 1) search costs (costs of marketing -in case of suppliers);
2) costs of drawing a contract, negotiating, and obtaining information on supplier reliability, etc.; and 3) costs of monitoring, dispute resolution, renegotiation, and arbitration, etc (Nooteboom, 1993) .
In order to offset the impediments to offshore IT outsourcing, small firms can use a number of 
Online markets for IT services
Online market is defined as an interorganizational information system through which multiple buyers and sellers interact to accomplish one or more of the following market-making activities: identifying potential trading partners; selecting a specific partner, and executing the transaction (Choudhury, et al. 1998 ). Early literature on online marketplaces predicted that the reduction of coordination costs due to the introduction of IT would lead to a shift from hierarchy to market governance (Malone, et al. 1987) , while decrease in search costs would 
ONLINE MARKETS' EFFECTS ON TRANSACTION COSTS OF SMEs IN OFFSHORE IT OUTSOURCING
According to (Nooteboom, 1993) , one of the factors accounting for SMEs' relatively higher transaction costs is that their rationality is "more bounded", which results from their inferior capacities of information processing as well as from poorer availability of specialized personnel. To compensate for this type of bounded rationality, SMEs might buy in the necessary expertise (e.g. in procurement, IT, and finance, etc.), which, however, involves additional transactional costs (Nooteboom, 1993) . Nooteboom (1993) also predicts a trend toward trilateral governance in transactions with small firms, where a third party would exercise functions of control and arbitration. Finally, he suggests applying collective or institutional efforts to mitigate transaction or governance costs by restricting opportunistic behavior and uncertainty (Nooteboom, 1993) .
Online marketplaces help SMEs overcome their specific disadvantage quite in line with the directions outlined above. In principle, online marketplaces can enable smarter buying by providing SMEs with advice, standardized processes, and reference projects; they take on the transaction governance role by setting exchange rules and assuming the arbitration function; they provide rating and feedback tools that help distinguish reliable and reputable participants from lower quality participants and potential opportunists. The leading online marketplaces with a strong focus on IT services include Elance Online, Rent
Coder, eWork. Guru.com, GetACoder, and Scriptlance. Services delivery is supported by the online document management system, message board, and milestone tracking functionality. Finally, when a project is accomplished, the buyer can assign a rating to the supplier and provide a feedback on supplier's performance. In the analysis of market processes below we provide more details on how these marketplaces function.
The hypotheses to be tested in subsequent section are as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Online marketplaces for IT services reduce costs of contact for small for IT services reduce costs of contract for small for IT services reduce costs of control for small
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS PART 1
The effects of online m older analysis framework in a slightly different way, companies in offshore IT outsourcing.
Hypothesis 1b: Online marketplaces companies in offshore IT outsourcing. stakeholder analysis framework is to analyze ten market processes of a specific online marketplace, and their effects on buyers, suppliers, and market makers. These ten processes are product representation, regulation, risk management, influence, dispute resolution, search, pricing, logistics (which we term "service delivery" here), payment and settlement, and authentication (Kambil and van Heck 1998). The analysis identifies the net benefit or loss that each type of stakeholders incurs from participation in the marketplace, which explains marketplace adoption success or failure.
In this study we apply the process-stakeh by analyzing the different market processes with regard to their effect on transaction costs of SMEs in offshore IT outsourcing. Since the framework has some of its roots in the transaction costs theory we believe it to be appropriate to map it on three types of transaction costs -costs of contact, contract, and control -used by (Nooteboom, 1993) Authentication. Buyers and suppliers can rate one another and provide performance feedbacks, which forms their reputation at the online marketplace.
Product representation. Detailed supplier profiles are available at the marketplace. Supplier's qualification can be certified by a third party organization "Expert Rating". Buyers' feedback and ratings for previous projects in aggregated and detailed form are directly available in the supplier's profile.
Regulation. Participation at the marketplace for buyers and supplier is subject to Terms and Conditions, and Custom Software Seller Agreement. Issues such as communications between buyer and supplier, payments, use of 3 rd party code are subject to these regulations. Users violating the rules might be expelled from the marketplace.
Risk management. Escrow accounts, buyer /supplier rating, and feedback system as well as 3 rd party certification of suppliers' skills contribute to establishing trust at the marketplace.
Influence. Escrow accounts, buyer /supplier rating, and feedback system as well as 3 rd party certification of suppliers' skills contribute to establishing trust at the marketplace.
Dispute resolution. Arbitration procedure is available for buyers and suppliers in case there are disputes that cannot be resolved by other means. Internal investigation team performs the arbitration.
The analysis is summarized in Table 2 . Column Process identifies a market process, column
Description provides a brief description of the process and columns Effect on buyers and Effect on suppliers specify the effect of the market process on transaction costs of the respective stakeholder (compared to a situation when an SME would embark on offshore outsourcing on its own, i.e. without relying on an online marketplace). Table 2 .
In summary, online marketplaces thus cater for the needs of SMEs by providing them with standardized processes and tools of contacting, contracting, and controlling offshore suppliers of IT services. This partially compensates for the lack of ex when it comes to sourcing and evaluating offshore suppliers, and it also provides 3 rd party governance of the transactions. In addition, online marketplaces may provide a basis for the emergence of institutional trust, thus further reducing opportunism and transaction costs.
The ten market processes described an the example of Rent A Coder to a large extent represent generic functionality that is common to all online marketplaces as can be seen from Table 1 . However, low entry barriers allow less informed, less professional or lower quality participants to access the marketplace, which
ENTRY BARRIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET OUTCOMES
Hitt 2001) and other inefficiencies. Considering the effects of costly bidding and bid evaluation on the behavior of buyers and suppliers, Snir and Hitt (2003) found that due to the costs of bidding for IT projects, low quality suppliers are more likely to bid for high-value projects with a higher expected pay-off. The rising costs of bid evaluation, consequently, result in a situation when it becomes uneconomical for a buyer to perform bid evaluation (Snir & Hitt, 2003) . The buyer may choose to withdraw from the auction without awarding her project to a supplier.
On the other hand, low entry barriers for buyers facilitate market access for those who do not intend to award and execute their projects within the marketplace. Instead, such buyers do line suppliers are required to nds up by buyer's selecting one of several auction winners. In practice, however, comparison shopping or look for free consultations from bidders. Again, the result is a relatively low level of awarded projects (Radkevitch, et al. 2006 ).
In this study we focus on entry barriers for suppliers, which exist in two forms -entry fees and supplier screening by the marketplace. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS PART 2
The empirical data for the analysis were obtained from two leading online marketplaces for IT services. Marketplace 1 was established in 1998 and encompasses a wide variety of satisfaction across projects it must be possible to indirectly evaluate performance in projects across an online marketplace. We hypothesize that even if an auction ends up with a project award, performing a project with a lower quality supplier may lead to higher costs for the buyer due to higher control costs and higher probability of supplier's opportunism.
Hypothesis 3. Satisfaction with suppliers will be lower at an online marketplace with lower entry barriers for suppliers.
Project value. Low market entry barriers are likely to result in low bids for a number reasons, among which are suppliers' value function due to lesser investments in quality; and higher probability of opportunistic bidding due to less reputation at stake. Therefore, our final hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 4. Value of awarded projects will be lower at an online marketplace with lower entry barr
Data
professional services, from tax consulting to language translation and from creative writing to data entry. IT services, such as application development, web design and development, and database development represent the most substantial part of the marketplace's activity.
Marketplace 2 was founded in 2001 and focused on IT services, with the range of IT services similar to that of Marketplace 1.
In order to minimize the possibility for project heterogeneity to interfere into the causal logic, we focus on one subgroup of IT services for testing our hypotheses. Thus the homogeneity of
Hypotheses testing and discussion
We operationalize the relative level of market entry barriers for suppliers via the membership fee. Su t varies depending on the service t value, need to be operationalized. the rating projects from the different online marketplaces is ensured. We chose to focus on the subgroup that is labeled "Database Development" at Marketplace 1 and "Database" at Marketplace 2.
These categories seem to allow for a more rigorous comparison between the projects from the different marketplaces than such subcategories as, for instance, Application development at Descriptive statistics for the data is presented in Table 3 . persuasive and an explanation for that is required. One possible explanation can be that despite the fact that lower market entry barriers allow for the entry of lower quality suppliers, there is a sufficient number of high quality suppliers at both marketplaces, whose good performance over a number of projects has been certified via the rating and feedback system. Therefore, the fact that there might be lower quality suppliers at Marketplace 2 does not affect the award rate as there are a sufficient number of higher quality suppliers for a buyer to choose from.
Hypothesis 2 was formulated as follows: Satisfaction with suppliers will be lower at an online marketplace with lower entry barriers for suppliers. This hypothesis was not only rejected in its original form, but it appears that the average satisfaction at Marketplace 2 is marginally but ge price for database-related projects at Marketplace 1 (USD 756.8) appeared significantly higher than at Marketplace 1. Remarkably, the average ratings (9.59 out of 10 and 4.83 out of 5) both are extremely close to the highest limit of respective rating scale. A possible explanation for such a distribution of rating values may be that the rating systems are used by the buyers primarily to reward suppliers for good performance and to punish for bad performance rather than for objective performance evaluation. This explains a very high proportion of the highest project ratings -89% of ratings at Marketplace 1 and 94% at Marketplace 2.
Hypothesis 3 was formulated as follows: Value of awarded projects will be lower at an online marketplace with lower entry barriers for suppliers. This hypothesis has been confirmed.
Moreover, avera to be almost two and a half times higher than at Marketplace 2 (USD 322.4). Such a considerable difference might be explained by a) higher competition between suppliers at Second, while online marketplaces make the access to offshore resources easier, differences in market design lead to different market outcomes. We focused on the market entry barriers for suppliers, and the marketplaces were used for the empirical analysis. Hypotheses testing showed that supplier entry conditions make a significant difference for the value of projects performed at a marketplace. No impact on the rate of project awards was found. Buyer satisfaction with the supplier performance was marginally but significantly higher at the marketplace with lower entry barriers.
When analyzed together, the results of the second part of our investigation lead to an interesting conclusion. Third, an inquiry into the composition of the supplier pool at different marketplaces may provide a better idea of supplier quality.
